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The huge size of the Korean defense budget and its armed forces
have created a need for an operational analysis. It is shown through
a multivariate statistical analysis what some of the opportunity costs
of defense spending have been.
The Korea-U. S. alliance is discussed emphasizing developmental
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I. INTRODUCTION
This is a report about a central issue of Korean economics -
expenditures for national defense. Korean military spending in 19 70
reached a record 100 billion current Korean won; up 40 times since 1953
when The Bank of Korea compiled the first estimate of global military
spending, based on National Income Statistics Yearbook. During this
period, military outlays in current won have grown at the following
rate; 2.5 billion won in 1953, 11 billion won in 1957, 20 billion won
in 1962, 49 billion won in 1967, and 100 billion won in 1970.
Large armed forces have become a part of Korean life, as Korean as
Kimchee.
Although it has the 22nd largest population among the world's people,
Korea maintains the 6th largest armed forces on earth.
The arms race pattern of interaction between Korea and North Korea
is widely regarded as the major reasons for Korean arms spending.
Military expenditures provide a useful barometer of the momentum of
the arms race. Figure I shows that the rate of expansion of defense
expenditures was, by far, the sharpest for both sides during the last
8 years. North Korea spent 629 million dollars in 1968, while Korea
spent 235 million dollars. Adding U. S. military assistance of 204
million dollars, the sum was still far below that of North Korea. This




DEFENSE RELATED DATA FOR KOREA AND NORTH KOREA
Year 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1970 1971
Field Side
Military N 300 350 300 460 628 746 849
Expenditures
Current K 123 113 150 184 235 335 425
(US $ million)
GNP N 2,500 2,500 2,900 3,000 3,500 3,000 3,420
Current
Million US $ K 2,745 2,901 3,822 4,612 5,730 8,300 10,200
Armed Forces N 362 378 383 383 410 389 401
(1000 men) K 600 604 572 612 620 597 6 34
Relative N 12.0 14.0 10.3 15.3 18.0 24.9 25.0
Defense (%)
Burden K 4.5 5.6 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.0
Population N 11.8 12.0 12.3 12.5 13.0 13.9 14.0
(million) K 27.2 28.0 28.8 29.0 30.5 32.0 32.7
Above data was derived from the series of "Armed Forces of the World"
by Robert C. Sellers.

FIGURE 1
MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND GNP ESTIMATE











It is reasonable to assume that defense spending has to come at the
expense of something else. Alternatively , it is sometimes suggested that
government expenditures such as defense, utilize resources that would
otherwise be unemployed in the economy. This thesis will show which
industry and factor of the economy are affected disproportionately from
defense spending. Furthermore, it will enable us, in a sense, to do a
cost benefit analysis of war or preparedness, and to identify the
opportunity costs in the kind and amount of social benefits that are
likely to be forgone. Thus the following assumptions are appropriate to
precisely the kind of question relating to this study. If the civilian
and military expenditures consistently compete for scarce resources, they
will be highly negatively correlated. If they both are driven by the
same factor, they will be positively correlated. If they generally
compete but sometimes are viewed as complimentary, the negative correla-
tion will be fairly low. By this criterion, one would hope to see
periodic upswings in defense requirements financed largely out of
personal consumption, with capital formation and such social investment
in the public sector as health and education being insensitive to
military demands. Another aspect of this criterion is the anticipation
that in periods of declining military needs the released resources
would be used for investment or education rather than returned to private
consumption.
Fourteen sectors, or factors, of Korean economy, which are particu-
larly concerned with military expenditures will be treated in this
thesis. Various kinds of private and public expenditures were calculated
as a proportion of GNP and these were then correlated with the proportion
of GNP represented by defense spending.

Multivariate statistical methods were used. Further, statistical
hypothesis testing methodology was used to determine if a strong relation-
ship between the variables or between one variable and another set of
variables existed. Partial correlation coefficients were compared with
another set of correlation coefficients to see their dependence when
the effect of another set of correlated variables has been removed.
The next chapter, Chapter II, is a discussion of the opportunity costs
of Korean defense. It is included to provide information on current
and past research and to discuss some of the assumptions in the issues
in defense economics relating to the model, in a specific application
to the Korean defense. Chapter III contains a discussion of the
economic value of alliances, since the Korean defense had a strong
connection with U. S. The injection of 2.168 billion dollars of U.S.
military assistance and the huge influx of U. S. economic aid, some
4.7 billion dollars, both over the period of 19 46-19 68, requires more
analysis
.
The final chapter contains a summary of this research effort and
some suggested areas for future work.
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II. THE BURDENS OF DEFENSE
In this chapter, the author shall examine information on expenditures
by GNP categories, by function, and by governmental unit to see what
kinds of alternative spending bear the brunt of military spending.
First, an overview of the changing level of defense expenditures in
1965 constant market prices may be helpful. For 1953, in what was the
Korean wartime year Korea has experienced, defense expenditures were over
39 billion won. After Korean War, they roughly decreased at the rate of
3.5% annually until they hit the minimum of 27 billion won in 1963.
Defense expenditures started to rise rapidly, at the rate of 7.2% annually,
after 1963. What an expenditure of this magnitude means, is clearer when
it is measured against available economic resources. The value of Korean
output had expanded at a fairly steady 5.1% annually until 1963. After
1963, during the period of First and Second Five-Year Economic Development
Plan, Korea had a very rapid growth rate in GNP of 10.8% annually. The
2
curve which shows defense vs. year had the "V shape" with the minimum
in 1963, while GNP had the property of monoconic increase over the whole
time period. The reason for this relationship is that defense expendi-
tures were decreasing until GNP reached 705 billion won in 1963. One
other important property of defense expenditures during its decreasing
C. f. Table 1 and Table 2 in computer output for the following
discussions.
2
C. f . Variable 1 of Basic Data and Graph in computer output.
11

phase of the "V shape" (1953-1963) is that defense expenditures were
decreasing absolutely in spite of the small rate of increase in GNP.
This result can be viewed as due to a low priority within Korean economic
development preference structure. When inspecting the graph of defense
3
vs. GNP, defense expenditures were decreasing slowly until they hit
27 billion won, and GNP and defense were both increasing rapidly after
that turning point. What this means becomes clearer when the ratio of
4defense to the GNP vs. GNP was inspected. The graph in this case, shows
strictly decreasing relative burden of defense as a function of GNP. The
relative burden of defense can be thought of as a price of defense to the
nation as well as a demand for security, while GNP can be thought of as
a level of income of the nation or its supply of resources. This graph
suggests that when GNP was low, the nation suffered a heavy burden from
defense spending, but a relatively lesser burden when GNP increased. It
also shows that the relative demand for defense was inelastic. In
discussing the defense burden the relative burden of defense expenditures
as percentage of GNP is the most meaningful indicator. Looking at the
graph .which represents the yearly change in the ratio of defense to GNP,
it suggests that before 1963, the ratio sharply decreased, while its
decrease slowed down after 1963.
This means that the reordering of the nations resource allocation
took place and defense expenditures were being emphasized at the expense
3
C.f. See that graph in computer output.
C.f. the graph next to the graph of defense vs. GNP in computer
output.
C.f. the graph in computer output.
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of other sectors of the economy. The correlation coefficient between
defense and GNP was 0.5652 which was statistically significant at 5%
level, while that between the ratio of defense to GNP and GNP was -0.7716
which was also statistically significant. Therefore, these facts
suggest that Korea did not suffer a heavy rise in defense expenditures
in terms of relative burden of defense, although the amount of defense
spending increased in terms of won.
The most commonly used indicator for the purpose of relative burden
of military expenditures, the ratio of military spending to GNP, is in-
adequate if used alone, and may be misleading. A major weakness of
this ratio is that it fails to take account of the level of economic
strength as represented by per capita incomes.
According to the Almanac of World Military Power in 1971, the
estimated GNP of Korea was about 8.3 billion dollars, while the GNP of
North Korea was 3. A billion dollars. The relative burden of defense
was 4% for Korea and 25% for North Korea. The per capita GNP for Korea
was 254 dollars, while that of North Korea was 243 dollars in 1971.
Both Korea and North Korea fell into the category of high spenders for
military purposes in terms of relative burden of defense and per capita
o
GNP among all the countries in the world.
C.f. the correlation matrix in computer output. All the statistical
tests on this thesis hereafter was based on 5% significance level.
Col. T. N. Dupuy, "The Almanac of World Military Power," pp. 257-274
o
Gerald C. Smith, "World Military Expenditures, 1970," United States
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, pp. 8.
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Changes in GNP are the major explanatory factor for all variables
except foreign aid. GNP had an almost linear relationships with the
other variables except for defense expenditures which is nonlinear.
In chapter I, the author discussed the choice of variables which were
alternative opportunities to military expenditures. To see the validity
of the selections of variables, multiple correlation coefficients of
various combinations were calculated and tested in Table II.
The test of hypotheses about multiple correlation coefficients
suggest that military expenditures were highly correlated with all of
the other set of variables.
The relationship between GNP and defense expenditures is of major
interest in this thesis. The correlation coefficient between them was
0.5652. What interpretation is to be given to the apparent positive
relationship between them?
Does high GNP tend to cause high defense expenditures or is high
GNP associated with high defense expenditures? . To answer this question,
it is useful to consider the correlation between them while holding all
other variables fixed; i.e., the partial correlation coefficient. If
the effect of all other governmental expenditures is removed, GNP and
defense are negatively correlated, i.e., rl,2.3 = -0.4828. The same
effect results when holding investment effect fixed. When the effect of
foreign aid was removed, the relationship between GNP and defense
decreased, i.e., rl,2.9 = 0.4413. This suggests that foreign aid






CORRELATION COEFFICIENT BASIC COMPOS
Rl-2, 3, ...,-15 0.99209 0.99964
R1'12, 13, 14, 15 0.93860 0.99435
R1.2, 3, 4, 5 0.93286 0.97600
R2'4, 5, 7 0.99906 0.97605
Rl»2, 7 0.96603 0.97314
RIO, 9 0.64333 0.94326
R2«5, 9 0.97304 0.94231
R2'10, 11 0.96809 0.97803
All the elements with significance at 0(= 0.05 level i.e., for all
the multiple correlation coefficient the hypothesis that there is no




Next to defense, the largest single outlay that government makes is
for education as shown in Table I in computer output. Like the military
budget, educational expenditures increased very rapidly during the last
18 years, 6.6% annually. However, it was still less than half of
defense expenditures. Considering the rapid growth of the school-age
population, expenditures for education was not much appreciably per
9
pupil. The number of pupils at primary school was 5.55 million in 1969.
This indicates Korean expenditures for public education was less than
3,600 won (less than 10 dollars) per primary school child, assuming all
funds go to primary schools. The correlation coefficient between
defense and education was 0.4023 which was statistically insignificant
at 5% level and it was 0.3967 when both were measured in terms of the
ratio to GNP. For both cases education had weak relationship between
defense, but nonetheless important. A widespread assumption holds that
public expenditures on education have experienced a long-term secular
growth in Korea. That assumption is correct only with modifications.
The proportion of GNP devoted to public education has roughly increased
until 1962, but rapidly decreased thereafter from 2.0% in 1962 to 1.5%
in 1970. One interesting fact is that this decreasing part coincides
with that of rapidly increasing part of defense expenditures. This
fact supports the results that the reordering of resource allocation took
place at that time. Public expenditures for education seemed to be
insensitive to the pressures of defense, since the correlation coeffi-
cients between them were as low as 0.4023. However, if the effect of
GNP or government expenditures was removed, then defens and education
9
Economic Planning Board, "The System of Korean Government"






competed for limited resources, i. e., 1,14.2 = -0.902 and 1,14»3
-0.7602. Thus the sensitivity of educational expenditures to military
need is much more marked in terms of partial correlation coefficients.
For all publicly supported health care, the Korean government paid
out an estimated 1.05 billion won in 19 70, or one-fiftieth as much as
defense spending. For all Koreans, this amount spent for health care
averaged out to almost nothing. The simple correlation coefficient
between defense and health care was 0.5985 which was significant.
However, the correlation coefficient in terms of the ratio to GNP
between them was -0.8062. Thus public health care was more sensitive
to the pressures of defense than education. This can be interpreted to
suggest that education was preferred to public health care in Korea.
Accordingly, it seems fair to conclude from the above, that increasing
defense spending has hampered the nation in its attempt to build a
healthier citizenry.
The correlation coefficient between recreation and defense was
-0.9558, in terms of ratio to GNP. It suggests that Korea did not give
much attention to this side, and that expenditures for recreation were
the least preferred among all the sectors of Korean economy.
Korean armed forces were estimated at about 63A,A00 men in 1971.
The ratio of armed forces to population was 2%. When compared with the
economically active male population, in 19 71, the level of armed forces
was really significant, one man out of every 10 economically active
men.
A nation's international balance of payments is often a major
casualty of sharp increases in military expenditures; the Korean
situation is not unusual. Some potential exports are diverted to
17

satisfy internal demand. Others are lost because domestic inflation
raises costs to the point that the goods are priced out of the world
market. In 19 70, Korea imported 540 billion won worth of goods, while
exporting 228 billion worth of goods. Over the period of this survey,
the correlation between them was 0.980 3, which was statistically signi-
ficant. The correlation coefficient between defense and export was
0.7230, while 0.7427 for import; both were statistically significant.
This suggests that Korean defense depends on foreign exchange, especially
in imports.
The correlation between private consumption expenditures and defense
expenditures was highly positive. This suggests that both were increased
by the same factor, GNP. Private consumption has indeed been the
largest alternative use of defense money. This fact can be explained
r r




i,4.9 = 0.3634. These relationships mean that for
fixed GNP or fixed government expenditures, the defense was really
competing with private consumption expenditures. The effect of foreign
aid turned out to be crucial, in the sense that foreign aid smoothed
the competition between defense and private consumption expenditures.
The defense expendutures roughly decreased at the rate of 3.5% annually
from 1953 to 1963. During that time, private consumption expenditures
increased 5% annually. Considering the ratio to GNP, it was the most





The correlation coefficient between defense spending and investment,
in terms of percentage of GNP was -0.5423. What it means is that Korea
continued to shift more money to investment from defense spending. When
compared with private consumption expenditures, the correlation was
-0.9170, in terms of percentage of GNP. Furthermore, when inspecting
the data and the correlation matrix in the computer output, the invest-
ment was highly negatively correlated with government expenditures,
education, as well as private consumption and defense expenditures in
terms of percentage of GNP. One more important fact is that investment
was the only factor which increases yearly, in terms of a percent of
GNP among those above. Combining those results, it can be concluded
that investment was the most preferred sector of Korean economy.
The level of government expenditures defines the level of requisite
tax burden. In this context, increase in defense expenditures caused an
increase in taxation, thus the highly positive correlation between
government expenditures and defense resulted. Expanded defense needs are
usually financed by a combination of increased taxation and deficit
spending. Bank notes and coin issued in each year during the last ten
years, were approximately the same amount as the defense expenditures.
The high level of government expenditures appears to be the prime reason
for inflation. Multiple regression coefficients show the joint relation-
ship of defense to a set of variables of GNP, government expenditures,
private expenditures and investment. This suggests that defense
The Bank of Korea, "Economics Statistics Yearbook 1971," pp. 92,
the correlation coefficient between them was 0.955.
C.f. the last page of computer output.
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expenditures can be predicted as a linear combination of the above four
variables. Thus the increase in one dollar for each sector is associated
with changes in defense expenditures as follows; 10 cents for GNP, 64
cents for government expenditures, -19 cents for private consumption
expenditures, -1 cent for investment. The result can be written as a
regression equation;
Defense Expenditures = 26.5 + 0.1 (GNP) + .64 (Government
Expenditures) - .19 (Private Consumption
Expenditures) - .01 (Investment).




III. THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF ALLIANCES
The Korea-U. S. Alliance can be thought of as a collective good.
The U.S. extends an umbrella to cover Korea from communist attack, and
at the same time, augments its own forces by the extent of the Korean
defense effort. After the Korean War, the number of U. S. troops in
Korea remained roughly the same. From 1954 until 19 70 there were two
divisions of varying strength. Today, operational control of all the
Korean troops is exercised by the Commanding General, U. S. Eighth
Army, who concurrently holds the post of Commander of the U. S. Forces
in Korea. In a military alliance, the collective good aspect remains
important. The small country will feel able to relax its own efforts,
because it has obtained the protection of a great power. The U. S.
may indeed want to limit the credibility of its assurances, since they
carry a risk of involvement in a major war for the sake of Korean
objectives, that may be trivial for the U.S.
The U. S. commitment to the defense of Korea was formally embodied
in the 1954 Mutual Defense Agreement and in repeated assurances by
various presidents and through numerous U. S. officials. The treaty,
however does not commit either country to go to war if the other is
invaded, but seeks to provide a less firm commitment. This obscurity may
give some confidence to North Korea and some doubt to Korea. Moreover,
the U. S. withdrew one division in 1971, and again withdrew the lone
U. S. Division guarding the 18 mile stretch of the D. M. Z. and turned
the defense of the entire 155 mile boundary over to the Korean Army.
The U. S. now has the additional time to decide whether or not to
21

commit its ground forces after the start of hostilities. Consequently,
withdrawals of these kinds increased the doubt over the U. S. commitment
12
and stimulated the defense budget of Korea in 1971.
Senator George McGovern stated "Asia is seen as having only a
13
marginal bearing on vital American interests." In spite of 157,530
lives and about 5 billion dollars which had already gone to Korea, the
U. S. still intends retrenchment in its foreign affairs with regard to
Korea.
As Olson and Zechauser pointed out, it is reasonable to assume that
the larger the nation, the more disproportionate the share of the total
military cost it will bear, and the failure of burden sharing would
thus indicate the success of deterrence. In reality, the deterrence
provided in the Defense Treaty, successfully aided Korea in achieving
two Five-Year Economic Development Plans without large defense expenditures,
Regrettably, many countries must strive to make economic and social
progress while carrying a heavy burden of defense, and military needs
compete with development projects for limited resources.
12
The defense budget in 1971 was 134 billion won in current prices
which was 27.2% increase from 1970.
13
U. S. Senator George McGovern "Toward a More Secure America -
an Alternative National Defense Posture", pp. 24.
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Looking at Figure II, U. S. military assistance as a percent of
Korean military expenditures was 282% in 1958 and 122% in 1967, averaging
180% over 13 years. How can Korea maintain a large military establish-
ment and at the same time, finance rapid developments without U. S. aid?
To make measurements of the military burden of the Korean economy,
it is necessary to evaluate the U. S. aid.
Did military assistance have developmental effects? The answer turns
primarily upon whether the Korean government resources and U. S. aid were
tangible, and what would have been the reactions of the Korean government
to a withdrawal of military budget support. Given a resource constraint,
if the Korean government had raised taxes to make up part of the loss
which might come from elimination of military assistance., it is likely
that a major part of these taxes would have reduced private savings
and investment. In these circumstances, the primary effect of military
budget support, was to make available more Korean resources for
development
.
The correlation coefficient between defense expenditures and foreign
aid was -0.3950. This suggests that high defense spending was associated
with low foreign aid and the correlation was statistically not signifi-
cant. Partial correlation coefficients were as follows; r19 . 2 = 0.014,
r 1^.3 - 0.027, ^9.5 - 0.149. These suggest that, for fixed GNP or
government expenditures or investment, defense expenditures were
independent of foreign aid. Foreign aid was negatively correlated with
GNP with coefficient -0.7134. Furthermore, this fact can be interpreted
to suggest that increases in GNP lead to decreases in foreign aid after
1957.
14 Correlation coefficient between defense and military assistance
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IV. SUMMARY AND AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY
In summary, it has been shown that the burden of defense can be
interpreted in terms of the opportunity costs of the kind and amount
of social benefits that are likely to be forgone. In large part, the
burden of a big defense budget has been thrust onto Korea by the demands
of the arms race with North Korea. Past fluctuations in defense and
civilian need indicate what some of the opportunity costs of defense
spending have been.
The Korean economic standard of living, in real terms, has shown a
significant improvement during the past 8 years, after the Third
Republic began. The diversion of resources to military purposes has
expanded in accordance wih the Korean capacity to produce after 1963.
On the requirement that defense upswings be financed largely out
of private consumption as well as sacrificing public expenditures for
education and health care, part of the growth dividend since 1963
has been dissipated in higher defense expenditures, rather than contri-
buting to the improvement of the nation's welfare. However, in spite
of increasing per capita defense expenditures, the burden of defense
has been reduced during the entire period of study, since GNP per capita
increased more rapidly. One result, however, is that in that period
of declining military needs, the released resources be allocated
largely for consumption and education first, and then switched largely
for investment. It suggests that educational needs apparently could
not be sacrificed or postponed when military needs were great, although
the amount of expenditures was far less than that of defense purposes.
25

During the entire period of survey, investment's share of the GNP
was the only factor which was continuously rising among the sectors
of the economy. Combining with continuously decreasing relative,
defense spending, this drop in relative defense spending has perhaps
enabled investment to rise. In the long run, a nation's strength depends
on a continuing high level of investment. In this sense, Korean
economic policy achieved great success in concentrating its efforts on
investment, rather than for defense, so that Korea has become the model
case for developing countries.
Alliances in the form of U. S. military and economic aid, not only
proved successful in its deterrence effect, but also provided a means
for allowing Korea to make available more resources for development
projects.
There are several areas which seem suitable for further study.
First, statistical estimation procedures should be applied within a
linear regression model and indicate the amount in dollars by which
an item of civilian spending changes in response to a one-dollar
increase or decrease in defense. Second, defense expenditures are
not necessarily without social utility. The positive effects of
military establishment were not discussed here . These effects could
be developed further, as well as the social value of defense. A
third area for study is the regional impact of military spending. This
area needs a higher degree of data and more information about the
geographical distribution of the military establishment. Finally, the
model could be extended to more detailed subcategories of the economy.





Past opportunity costs in Korea do not provide a perfect guide or
deterministic mold for the future. Both the political system and the
economy change. Should it be concluded, after enlightened discussion,
that certain new defense needs must be met, it is possible, by careful





MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS TO THE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
The mathematical model on which this analysis is based is
multivariate Normal distribution or a combination of multivariate Normal
distributions. The main justification for studying methods relating
to the Normal distribution so intensively, is that this mathematical
model is suitable for such a large number of cases, when multiple
measurements are treated.
In this case, as well as a host of others in econometrics, the
multivariate Normal distributions have been found to be sufficiently
close approximations to the true population, so that statistical analysis
based on these models are justified. Another reason for confining this
study to considerations of Normal theory is that multivariate methods
based on the Normal distribution are extensively developed, and can be
studied in a rather organized and systematic way.
The Basic Data is a rectangular matrix denoted "A". It is composed
of 270 elements. That is, 18 observation for every 15 variables.
i = 1, 2 , ..., 18
A = (
aij),
j = 1, 2, . . ., 15
Each column represents the variables which are indexed by j , j = 1, 2,
. .
.
, 15 as follows:
1. defense expenditures
2. GNP
3. government consumption expenditures
4. private consumption expenditures




6. wholesale price index, 1965=100
7. population in millions




12. public administration and defense products
13. recreation and entertainment
14. education
15. sanitary services
All the data, except for population and foreign aid, came from "National
Income Statistics Yearbook 19 71" by The Bank Of Korea, and population
and foreign aid came from "Economic Statistics Yearbook 19 71" by The
Bank of Korea.
All amounts were measured in billion Korean won of the 1965 constant
market value, except for variables 6, 7 and 8. Variables 1 and 3 were
adjusted to constant market prices in 1965 as follows:
amount in constant amount at current market prices
market prices in 1965 price deflator for government spending
Variables 9, 10 and 11 were adjusted as follows:
amount in constant
, „
„ . . .
= Amount in dollars x exchange ratio in
market prices in 1965
This calculation assumed that the value of U. S. dollars changed insigni-
ficantly, when compared with change in won value.
29

Each row number represents the corresponding year which is indexed
by i, i = 1, 2, . .
.
, 18
Year = row index + 52
e.g. For 1st row: 1 + 52 = 53, i.e., the data in 1953.
Therefore, this survey covered the period of 18 years, from 1953 to 19 70.
The Composition Data is a rectangular matrix denoted "B". It is
composed of 270 elements, and it was derived as follows:











^ 2j •" 18
1J 3=1, 2, ..., 15
Since the variables 2, 6, 7 and 8 were not transformed, they are the
same numbers as those in Basic Data. The method of maximum likelihood
was used to a large extent, since it leads to reasonable procedures
,
and it gives unbiased estimates of some important parameters.
First, to see how much Korea had spent for some variables during the
last 18 years, the total sum of the amounts were calculated. In statis-
tics, central value refers to the location of the center of the distribu-
tion and it gives the general behavior of some variables. This is shown
next to the sums in computer output.
The cross-product deviations, variance-covariance matrix, and the
standard deviations of each variable was shown, to see how the observations
were spread out from the average.
The purpose of this analysis, is to predict the dependence between
variables. The notion of correlation coefficient was expanded to
multiple correlation and partial correlation, to see the dependence
between one variable and another set of variables, and the dependence
30

vhen the effect of other correlated variables have been removed,
respectively. Cross-tabulation plots of any two variables were scaled
to 50x100 character spaces or units, by computer, to identify how two
variables were related to each other visibly.
Null hypothesis about the simple correlation coefficient, was that
a pair of variables were not correlated. To test this hypothesis,
t - statistics were used with significance level of 5% and power of
test as 90%. The confidence interval for this test was (-0.4683,
0.4683). Null hypothesis about the multiple correlation coefficient,
was that there is no relationship between one variable and another set
of variables. To test this hypothesis, F - statistics were used with
significance level of 5% and power of test as 90%. Multiple regression
shows the joint relationship of defense expenditures to a set of
variables of GNP, government expenditures, private expenditures and
investment. T values were computed and tested for 99.9% of confidence-
interval. All the t - values were accepted. F value was computed and
tested for the independence of denominator and numerator. This test
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